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FOREWORD
LITIGATING FEDERAL HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION
AND THE INTERSTICES OF PROCEDURE
Wendy Collins Perdue *
On November 11, 2011, the University of Richmond Law Review held its annual Allen Chair Symposium, focused on the litigation challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act ("ACA"). Recognizing that much had already been written
about the constitutionality of the ACA, but that less scholarly attention had been focused on issues such as jurisdiction, standing,
ripeness, and severability, the Symposium was entitled "Everything but the Merits." The timing of this Symposium was both
prescient and awkward. Three days after the Symposium was
held, the Supreme Court took certiorari on a group of the ACA
cases and scheduled an extraordinary three days of argument. Of
course once the Court decides these cases, prognostications will
be of little significance. Fortunately, the pieces that follow offer
insights that go far beyond the issues of the ACA litigation, examining a range of issues about constitutional litigation.
One of the major themes of these pieces is judicial restraint.
Edward Hartnett and Tobias Dorsey consider judicial restraint
from the perspective of the potential scope of a ruling on the merits of the ACA. Hartnett examines the difference between facial
and as-applied constitutional challenges and argues for the restraint inherent in the latter. He observes that facial challenges
are a "winner-take-all" proposition and argues that courts are "in
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general better suited to adjudicating on as as-applied basis." He
concluded that at least as to challenges to the individual mandate
"the Court is being asked to articulate a principle for the first
time, it is freer to capitalize on its comparative competence, and
... render a decision that lowers the stakes rather than raises
them."
Tobias Dorsey looks at a different aspect of scope-the issue of
severability-and offers the unique insight of a lawyer who
worked for many years in the Office of Legislative Counsel of the
House or Representatives. He argues that the Court should reject
a test that purports to divine whether a particular piece of legislation would have been enacted absent the provision that turns
out to be unconstitutional. Having seen up close the legislative
sausage being made, Dorsey argues that it is neither possible nor
seemly for a court to determine what would have happened had
one provision been different. As he explains: "A statute is not the
result of a legislative bargain. A statute is the product of a convergence of microbargains, between and among 100 Senators, 435
Representatives, and the White House." The tradeoffs made are
not only within a single bill but also "between this bill and that
hearing, and between this bill and that nomination." He concludes that the issue of severability "should be treated like any
other Article III judicial power-it should be used with restraint."
"When the Court decides to strike part of a statute, it should
strike as narrowly as possible." To do otherwise, Dorsey argues, is
to allow the Court to act as the House of Lords and veto legislation wholesale.
Christopher Bryant considers judicial restraint from a broader
perspective and argues that upholding the constitutionality of the
ACA would constitute "constitutional forbearance" that would
"begin restoration of a distinction between constitutional law and
partisan politics." This restoration is, according to Bryant "sorely
needed and long overdue." Acknowledging that forbearance might
not be appropriate in cases in which the ordinary political processes are unreliable, he argues that this is not the case with the
ACA. The most controversial of the law's provisions, the individual mandate, applies to virtually every person in the country, so
majoritarian political processes need not be displaced by Court
intervention. While Bryant's article is not strictly "procedural" in
its focus, it argues for an interpretative stance that has significance beyond "the merits" of the ACA cases.
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In contrast, Kevin Walsh would have the Court exercise restraint not by limiting the scope of its ruling or by adopting a particular interpretative stance, but by declining to decide the issue
at this time. He focuses his analysis on the Anti-Injunction Act,
explaining first how under that Act a constitutional challenge to
the ACA is premature. He then situates such restraint in a
broader context, arguing that "a decision not to decide could
strengthen the Supreme Court, in a way, since its legitimacy derives in part from its identity as a court of limited jurisdiction
that resolves concrete cases." Thus, Bryant and Walsh offer two
different visions of Supreme Court legitimacy-Bryant would
have the Court prove its non-political stripes by deciding the case
contrary to partisan expectations, and Walsh would have it apply
jurisdictional doctrines in a precise and lawyerly way that would
emphasize that the Courts' job "is not to decide about the validity
of law considered in itself, but to decide on the obligations of persons under the law."
A second major theme of these pieces is the role of states both
as litigant in challenges to the ACA and participants in the
broader debates about health care reform. Stephen Viadeck's essay on state standing sounds some of the same themes as Hartnett, Dorsey, Bryant, and Walsh. Vladeck situates the Virginia
litigation in the broader jurisprudence of state standing cases and
concludes that the Fourth Circuit reached the right conclusion.
However the essay goes beyond doctrinal analysis and argues
that "state standing in such circumstances should be disfavored"
because relaxed state standing rules "create a very real risk of
converting the federal courts into councils of revision" and may
"short-circuit the principal means through which majorities have
traditionally exercised control over the scope of federal power-at
the ballot box."
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard approaches the role of states from a
different perspective, examining the rhetorical significance of federalism in the debates about the ACA. "States' rights" is not a
new battle cry in debates over divisive issues of public policy and
Leonard examines how this theme has developed both in the state
response to the ACA and in the litigation challenging it. She
notes that "[t]he issue of the proper scope of federal power vis-avis states has become the central, signature issue of ACA opposition" and argues that rhetorical federalism "should not be disregarded simply as partisan sour grapes by Obamacare or Obama
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opponents but instead should be considered valuable to the
health care decision making process and state-federal relations."
Robert Claiborne's comment offers a close examination of one
state's legislative foray into the ACA and concludes that Virginia's Health Care Freedom Act should not be understood as a traditional state "nullification" effort. Unlike some state resolutions
passed in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, Virginia has
not denied the legitimate authority of the Supreme Court to decide the controversy. On the contrary, Virginia filed suit in federal court. Claiborne argues that the Virginia legislation should be
understood as an effort that respects Supreme Court and federal
supremacy but that merely sought to give the state a seat at the
table at which the constitutional discussion would occur.
Finally, Bradley Joondeph offers "five questions" that succinctly summarize many of the issues raised in the other pieces. His
questions address issues of judicial displacement of the political
process, the proper role of states in the health care system,
whether Congress's powers to enact even more comprehensive
health care reform implies the power to do less, the appearance of
court entanglement with partisan politics, and judicial restraint.
The questions he raises are ones that are likely to be relevant not
only to the ACA litigation but to other critical public policy issues
that end up, as so many do, in the courts.
This Symposium issue focuses not on the scope of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause or the meaning of the Tenth
Amendment. Instead it focuses on the doctrines and principles
that shape constitutional adjudication in this and other cases.
Henry Maine famously observed about the common law that "the
substantive law [was] . . . secreted in the interstices of proce-

dure."' The same may prove to be true of the substantive constitutional law principles at stake in the ACA litigation.
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